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Abstract:  In many countries shareholders were offered more rights to protect their 
position against “inappropriate” behaviour of other corporate constituents. Whether 
these developments resulted in more market participation and deeper and more liquid 
markets, as argued in law and finance theory, remained an open question. For a large 
sample of European listed companies we reveal part of the answer: we analyse the 
evolution of the investment behaviour of foreign shareholders in a large sample of 
European companies between 1999 and 2007.  
 
A steadily growing number of all large stakes belong to foreign shareholders. 
However, the average voting block of a foreign shareholder decreased in all countries 
but in Germany. The results show that the hypothesis of a straightforward inverse 
linear relationship between shareholder rights and ownership concentration is not 
confirmed. Other features drive the development of ownership structures. These 
factors are of a legal nature, like the mandatory bid threshold, or are more shareholder 
specific, like the investment contraints of UCITS.  
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Free capital movement is one of the “four freedoms” enabling competitive financial 
markets. However, an open market requires the abolishment of barriers to operate 
abroad. In 1999, the European financial services action plan was the start to (further) 
reduce many barriers for European wide investing.1 It was later accompanied with a 
plan to modernise corporate law 2, initiated by the High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts. Both plans resulted in a new and extensive framework for the integrated 
European capital market.  
 
Many but not all results of the integration of the European capital market have been 
studied.3 In this contribution I want to explore one other specific element: the 
development of foreign shareholders’ investments in the capital of listed entities in six 
European countries. The first section discusses briefly the leximetrics approach of 
company law. In the second section the dataset and the methodology that are used in 
this study are presented. Section three is subdivided in two parts: an analysis of the 
number and classes of foreign shareholders and an examination of size of the voting 
blocks of foreign shareholders. Section four describes foreign ownership from a 
portfolio approach. Section five concludes. 
 
1. Leximetrics of company and securities law. 
 
Leximetrics quantifies law. Since the development of the “law and finance” theory, 
many economists and lawyers have quantified shareholder, creditor, and employees 
rights via an analysis of company, securities and insolvency law. Lele and Siems4 
developed the widely criticised original model of La Porta and others5 with six one 
year “anti-director” rights and six one-year creditor rights into a model with 42 
shareholder rights, which help to protect the interest of shareholders against shirking 
of directors and 18 minority shareholder rights, which help to protect the interest of 
minority shareholders against expropriation of controlling shareholders over a period 
of thirty-five years in five countries (US, UK, India, Germany and France). Not every 
right is covered, but in a diligent way they combine many pivotal rights in corporate 
law while taking into account considerations of contract law and civil procedure. The 
rights are more or less centered around the position and power of individual 
shareholders vis-à-vis the general meeting and vis-à-vis the powers and position of 
directors and boards. In light of the following analysis of ownership structures we 
expanded their model with Italy and Belgium for the period of 1994 and 2005. A 
summary of the findings is presented in figure 1. The shareholder index shows an 
increase in shareholder rights in all countries. By the end of 2005 all countries offered 
all shareholders between 25 and 30 rights (on a scale of 42 rights). For France, 
                                                  
1  European Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial 
Markets: Action Plan, Brussel, 11 May 1999, COM (1999) 232, 32 p. 
2  European Commission, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in 
the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward, Brussel, 21 May 2003, COM (2003) 284, 29 p. 
3  For a number of studies, see the European website 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/reports/index_en.htm (last accessed 31 January 2010). 
4  P. Lele and M. Siems, “Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach”, Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 2007, 17-50. 
5   R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny, “Legal Determinants of External 
Finance”, Journal of Finance 52, 1997, 1131-1150. 
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Germany and Belgium the increase is statistically significant.6 The variability of the 
rights between the five developed countries is limited and even decreased over the 
years. Whilst Belgium offered less than half of the total number of rights to 
shareholders in 1994 and the UK already offered more than 26 rights, the difference 
between the best – the UK – and the worst performing country – Belgium – was less 
than 4 rights in 2005. The development of the minority shareholder rights index 
shows a different pattern. In three out of five countries, minority shareholders 
experienced hardly any increase in the number of the shareholder rights. In France the 
latest development was even negative: the quorum rules for decision making at 
general meetings of shareholders were softened. Acting against expropriation of large 
shareholders is only supported in Germany with new rights.There are no significant 
differences in any of the countries between 1994 and 2005. In this setting, Italy has 
the best formal institutional setting protecting the minority shareholders. We will 
discuss this finding further.7 Overall the different approach in continental Europe and 
in the UK is clear. In continental Europe blockholders are common. Therefore, the 
legislation endorsed and should endorse the protection of minority shareholders. The 
endorsement started already before 1995. In the UK, major blockholders are rather the 
exception than the rule. The UK supported the protection of shareholders against 
shirking of directors and management: the protection against (expropriation by) major 
shareholders is relatively weak developed.   
 
 
Figure 1: Development of shareholder and minority shareholder rights in five 
European countries (1994-2005) 
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Source: France, Germany and UK: P. Lele and M. Siems, “Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric 
Approach”, Journal of Corporate Law Studies 2007, 17-50; Belgium and Italy: own research (for Italy 
research assistance was provided by Ranieri Giunta and Endrit Mema) 
 
 
                                                  
6  See for a detailed analysis of the development, C. Van der Elst, Law and Economics of 
Shareholder Rights and Ownership Structures: How Trivial Are Shareholder Rights for Shareholders, 
working paper, November 2009, 59 p. 
7  See section 5. 
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In a “law and finance” setting the increase in the number of shareholder rights against 
shirking of directors suggests that the ownership concentration levels will decrease. 
Enhanced protection of the position of the shareholder will no longer require the same 
level of highly concentrated ownership as the latter is substituted by (the provision of) 
more shareholder rights. The insignificant increase in the number of minority 
shareholders rights against expropriation by controlling shareholders, implies that 
minority shareholders remain confronted with a significant probability of controlling 
shareholder expropriation. The impact of this status quo on the developments of the 
size of voting blocks of minority shareholders is ambiguous. It can be argued that 
minority shareholders will increase their voting power in order to counterbalance the 
position of the controlling shareholder. However, it is also possible that the minority 
shareholders reduce the exposure of expropriation by reducing their position in 
controlled companies.  
The development of the ownership of foreign shareholders is studied in the next 
sections. As this type of shareholder must rely on the qualities of the legal system – 
even more than national shareholders - it can be argued that they are more sensitive to 
formal legal developments.  
 
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
We have collected the voting right structure in 1999 and 2007 for a large sample of 
European companies listed before 1999 and until 2008.8  We opted for an identical 
sample in 1999 and 2008 to exclude the influence of different sample compositions. 
The distribution of the sample of companies in the dataset can be found in table 1. We 
included Spain notwithstanding the absence of the developments of the shareholder 
rights of this country, because the ownership data shows some remarkable differences 
between this country and the five other countries. The distribution of companies of 
different countries is more or less similar to the importance of the different national 
stock markets, except for France where the number of data is smaller and biased 
towards larger companies.9 The average market capitalisation of the French 
companies is almost three times the average of the overall sample. 
 
 
Table 1: Number and size of companies in the sample 
 
Number of 
Listed entities Avg. market Avg. market 
 in sample cap. 99 (mio.) cap 07 (mio)
France 95 10.513 12.375
Belgium 84 1.363 2.299
UK 272 3.339 4.209
Germany 242 3.971 3.658
Italy 114 3.305 4.558
Spain 95 2.694 5.512
Total 902   
 
                                                  
8  For the UK companies, the data are from april 2001 and 2007. 
9  The market capitalisation data were acquired via the different stock markets where the 
companies have their most important listing. 
 5
 
We based our analysis on data as they have been published by individual companies 
and their shareholders according to the legislation that transposes the major 
shareholdings directive of 1988 and the transparancy directive of 2001 and 2004. 
Next to annual reports different databases were used: for Belgium the data were 
obtained from Euronext NYSE Brussels transparency declarations, for France the data 
that were disclosed via the website of the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (formerly 
COB) are used, for Italy and Spain the information is provided by the Italian and 
Spanish supervisory authority Consob and Comision Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores, for the UK the ownership data were acquired from Hemscott and for 
Germany the databases of both Hoppenstadt Aktienführer and Bafin were used. 
 
Each shareholder holding a voting block of more than 5 per cent of the voting rights10 
of each company was classified in a shareholder class. The different shareholder 
classes that were used in all six countries are: individuals and families, non-financial 
companies, insurance companies, banks, the government and foreign shareholders. 
For the latter class, the shareholders were subdivided in identical classes as the classes 
used at national level. In all countries other types of shareholders exist. All these 
shareholders have been identified even though not all the data are presented for all 
these remaining shareholder classes.11  
While in most cases the type of shareholder was obvious, for a significant number of 
shareholders different sources, including several search engines, have been used to 
identify the type of shareholder. In another paper on “shareholder mobility” it is 
illustrated how the procedure was applied.12 As the law and finance theory requires 
the study of the voting power, in the next section the unweighted averages will be 
presented.  
 
 
3. Large foreign shareholders 
 
3.1.Representative classes of large foreign shareholders  
 
Companies experience an internationalisation of their ownership structure. Whereas 
the home country bias did not (yet) completely disappear, the increasing number of 
foreign shareholders acquiring large blocks in many European companies illustrate 
the decreasing importance of local investment policies. This development is more 
than likely due to the significant efforts of the European Union to develop an 
integrated capital market. In Belgium and Germany 30 per cent of all large stakes are 
in hands of foreign shareholders (figure 2). In France and the UK one of every four 
stakes belong to overseas shareholders. Southern European countries are lagging 
behind with 15 per cent to 20 per cent foreign blockholders. The internationalisation 
of the shareholder structure was remarkable in Germany and France. In Germany the 
                                                  
10  The lowest common threshold in all countries in both years. In the following sections these 
shareholders have been qualified as “large shareholders”. 
11  Some other important classes are (Dutch) “stichtingen administratiekantoren” in Belgium, 
“grouped holdings of employees” in France, “investment managers” in Germany, “investment 
managers”, “nominees”, and “trusts” in the UK, “fondaziona” in Italy and “fundacion” in Spain. In the 
UK, Germany and France national or foreign private equity funds and hedge funds are also common. 
12  See section 3.2. of in the paper C. Van der Elst, Shareholder Mobility in Five European 
Countries, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 104/2008. 
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growth in numbers over a period of eight years was almost 300 per cent and in France 
the number of foreign stakes doubled. Belgium and the UK which already had a 
relative high number of foreign shareholders in 1999, had rather modest growth rates. 
Southern European countries like Italy and Spain did not develop in a similar way. 
Italy experienced a small increase and in Spain the number of large foreign 
shareholders significantly decreased. There are several elements that help to explain 
the relative decline. First, there was a significant increase in the number of large 
stakes held by Spanish shareholders, resulting in a relative decline in the number of 
foreign shareholders. Especially individuals and non-financial Spanish companies 
acquired additional stakes. Next, a number of foreign banks and foreign non-financial 
companies sold their stakes. For both classes of foreign shareholders, mostly smaller 
blocks were sold in the market. In particular American banks sold their blocks.      
 
Figure 3 presents the allocation of large voting blocks in hands of foreign 
shareholders. In 1999, foreign non financial companies were the most and only 
important class of foreign investors in Belgium, France, Germany and Italy and the 
second most important class in Spain.  In Spain foreign banks held more large stakes. 
In the UK, foreign investment funds controlled more than half of the total number of 
large stakes held by foreign investors. In Belgium Dutch trusts (controlled by Belgian 
families) are of considerable importance.  
 
 
Figure 2: Relative number of large stakes (>5%) in hands of foreign shareholders 
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Source: own research 
 
 
This pattern changed significantly in the first decade of the twenty first century. In 
Germany and Belgium foreign non financial shareholders remained the most 
important class of foreign shareholders. In 2007, 12 per cent of all German large 
shareholder stakes and 10 per cent of all Belgian large shareholder stakes were held 
by foreign non financial companies. In France and Italy, the pole position of foreign 
non financial companies measured in number of large stakes, is taken over by foreign 
investment funds, which remained the most important foreign shareholder class in the 
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UK. In Spain, foreign banks and investment funds remained the most important 
foreign shareholder classes.  
 
 
Figure 3: Importance of the different foreign shareholder classes measured by number 
of large stakes (1999-2007) 
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In French and in German companies, foreign hedge funds acquired a significant 
number of large stakes. This development provides an explanation as to why these 
two countries are standing on the barricades for a regulatory framework for these 
funds at the moment of writing. Finally, with the exception of Spain, all countries 
experienced an increase in the number of large stakes in hands of foreign banks. In the 
UK this number more than doubled. It can be questioned whether this development 
must be supported. We certainly believe that the economic and banking crisis will 
have brought this process to an end.  
 
The importance of foreign ownership is also measured by the number of companies 
where at least one large voting block is in hands of foreign investors. Half of the 
companies in the UK and Belgium, 40 per cent of the companies in France and 
Germany and around 30 per cent of the companies in Spain and Italy have a large 
foreign shareholder. This evolution is similar to the evolution of the total number of 
foreign voting blocks: a significant increase in Belgium, France, Germany and the 
UK, a modest increase in Italy and a significant decrease in Spain. The results 
illustrate that the home biased investment did not completely disappear since in all 
countries at least half of the companies are unfamiliar with large foreign shareholders.  
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Figure 4: Relative number of companies with at least one large foreign shareholder 
(>5%) 
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Source: own research 
 
 
3.2.Size of the stakes of large foreign shareholders  
 
Another approach to study the developments of foreign investors looks at the size of 
the voting block of this investor class. The average voting block size is studied over 
time and compared with the voting blocks of the national investors.  
 
In all countries but Germany, the average voting block of foreign shareholders 
decreased between the turn of the century and 2007. In France the average voting 
block of a foreign shareholder is less than 20 per cent and in Italy, Spain, and the UK 
less than 15 per cent. In those four countries, the average foreign shareholder is not in 
a position to control the company, she is not even in the position to successfully block 
decisions requiring a supermajority approval. In Belgium and Germany the situation 
is different. The average voting block of a foreign shareholder is sufficient to block 
significant changes of the company requiring a supermajority approval. Germany, but 
also Belgium, experienced a significant increase in the number of large foreign stakes, 
illustrating the significant foreign investors’ power.  
 
The second part of the figure contains the average stakes of “national” large 
shareholders. In general, the average voting block of national large shareholders 
remained relatively stable over the last decade. In Belgium and Germany the average 
voting block decreased with 3 per cent to 4 per cent. Especially in the latter country, 
the developments of the position of foreign shareholders vis-à-vis the national 
shareholders are striking. Only in Germany foreign shareholders are – on average – 
more powerful than national shareholders. The Belgian situation is different as the 
large averages for foreign shareholders are due to the position of Dutch trusts in 
Belgian listed companies. These Dutch trusts are predominantly used as a specific 
control vehicle for Belgian family patrimonies. For France and Italy, the converse 
position of foreign large shareholders as in Germany can be found. In Spain and the 
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UK foreign shareholders have similar, though slightly smaller voting blocks than 
national shareholders.   
 
Figure 5: Evolution of the average voting block of large foreign shareholders and 
other shareholders  
 
A verage stake o f  a large fo reign 
shareho lder
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Be
lgi
um
Fra
nc
e
Ge
rm
an
y
Ita
ly
Sp
ain UK
1999
2007
A verage stake o f  a "nat io nal" large 
shareho lder
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Be
lgi
um
Fra
nc
e
Ge
rm
an
y
Ita
ly
Sp
ain UK
1999
2007
Source: own research 
 
 
Different investor classes can have different investment policies. Figure 6 presents the 
average voting blocks of the most common foreign investor classes. In 1999 it was 
common that foreign non financial companies had large, often de facto controlling 
voting blocks in Italy, France, Belgium, and Spain and a blocking minority in 
Germany. Conversely, foreign investment funds, insurance companies and banks only 
acquired – on average - smaller voting blocks of less than 10 per cent in all 
countries.13 Foreign individuals generally acquired relatively large blocks in Belgium, 
Germany and the UK, but small blocks in Spain.  
 
The investment policy of investment funds, insurance companies and banks vis-à-vis 
foreign countries was not adjusted. The average voting block of these types of 
shareholder classes remained under the threshold of 10 per cent in all countries. There 
is one exception. Via subsidiaries three banks had acquired a majority voting block in 
three German companies. These controlling voting blocks increased the average of 
foreign banks to almost 20 per cent of the voting rights.  
For the other classes of foreign investors there are a number of opposite 
developments. Non-financial companies acquired larger, de facto voting blocks in 
France, Germany and Belgium. This development should be read together with the 
significant increase in the number of voting blocks in hands of foreign non-financial 
companies in Germany and the opposite development in France. Somewhat 
exaggerating we can say that Germany became a country of subsidiaries, similar to 
Belgium. In Italy the average voting block of this shareholder class significantly 
dropped and was only slightly higher than the average block in the UK. Foreign 
                                                  
13  For these classes of shareholders the averages are only provided if there are at least four 
observations. 
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individual investors also behave differently in different countries. Whereas the 
absolute numbers of foreign individual investors remain modest, this type of investor 
hold or acquired a de facto controlling voting block in Belgium and Germany, but 
must be considered as a pure financial investor in Italy and Spain with average voting 
blocks of less than 8 per cent. In the UK, overseas individual investors seem to 
develop a similar policy as in Germany and Belgium: with an average of 25 per cent 
of the voting rights which is more than twice the average size of the voting block of 
the other foreign investor classes in the UK, this type of investor seeks de facto 
control over the UK company.  
 
Finally, the new types of investors, foreign private equity funds and foreign hedge 
funds not only acquired a significant number of blocks in Germany and France, the 
average voting block must be considered as higher than can be expected from a pure 
financial investment perspective. In both countries the average voting block is almost 
25 per cent.  
 
Figure 6: Evolution of the average voting block of different classes of large foreign 
shareholders 
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In continental Europe, the position of the largest shareholder is pivotal.14 Figure 7 
provides information on the position of the foreign shareholder as largest and de facto 
or de iure controlling shareholder. A de facto controlling foreign shareholder holds a 
voting block above the mandatory bid threshold and a de iure controlling foreign 
shareholder is a simple majority shareholder. In 1999, a significant portion of 20 per 
cent to 30 per cent of the Belgian, Spanish and British companies had a foreign 
                                                  
14  For an analysis see C. Van der Elst, Shareholder Mobility in Five European Countries, ECGI - 
Law Working Paper No. 104/2008. 
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shareholder as largest shareholder. Only in Belgium the large majority of these 
foreign shareholders controlled the company. In France, Germany and Italy less than 
10 per cent of the companies had a foreign shareholder as largest shareholder. German 
companies were in less than 5 per cent of the cases controlled by a foreign 
shareholder. Eight years later, the pattern altered significantly. In Germany more than 
25 per cent of the companies experienced a foreign shareholder as their largest 
shareholder and in France almost one out of every five companies. The number of de 
iure by foreign shareholders controlled German companies even overclassed the 
Belgian number. Equally in Belgium and in the UK the number of largest foreign 
shareholder increased whereas the number dropped in Italy and Spain. In Belgium, a 
large number of companies are de facto controlled by a foreign shareholder. The 
number soared to almost 20 per cent in 2007. While Italy is known for its highest 
concentration of ownership, it has the lowest number of foreign controlled companies.  
 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of the number of companies with a foreign shareholder as largest, 
de facto or de iure controlling shareholder  
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In Figure 8 we further investigated the development of the position of the largest 
“national” shareholder and the largest “foreign” shareholder.15 In most countries the 
largest national shareholder did not alter its voting block significantly. In Italy, Spain 
and the UK the difference in the voting block of the largest shareholder was less than 
1 per cent between 1999 and 2007, in France 2,5 per cent, in Germany less than 4 per 
cent and in Belgium 5 per cent. It must be noted that the countries where the decrease 
in ownership concentration was the largest, also where the countries were the 
                                                  
15  It should be stressed that only stakes that exceed the threshold of 5 per cent of the voting 
rights have been taken in this analysis. Companies with a widely dispersed ownership structure without 
shareholders passing this threshold of 5 per cent have been excluded. In all countries in the study less 
than 7 per cent of the companies belong to this “Berle and Means” type of companies. 
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shareholder rights index significantly increased over the period between 1997 and 
2005.  
 
The voting block of the largest foreign shareholder developed in an opposite direction 
in Germany and the variation is of a different magnitude in France, Italy, and Spain. 
In Germany the largest foreign shareholder has on average a nearly absolute control 
block. In France foreign shareholders have abandoned this position. In Spain the 
largest foreign shareholder significantly increased its position and in Italy the largest 
foreign shareholder significantly decreased its position. In the UK and Belgium the 
positions did not significantly change. However the largest foreign shareholder in 
Belgium has a larger voting block than national shareholders, whilst the converse 
situation can be found in the UK.  
 
 
Figure 8: Average voting block of the largest “national” shareholder and the largest 
foreign shareholder 
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4. Ownership from a Portfolio Approach  
 
Ownership can be studied in another dimension. Ownership structures can be 
identified by summing the total value of the shares in hands of a specified shareholder 
class related to the total market capitalisation in a specific country.  In most countries, 
a relatively small number of companies represent a large part of the total market value 
of the “national” stock exchange. Hence this method reflects and emphasizes the 
ownership structure of “blue chips”. FESE regularly studies the portfolio position of 
different types of the shareholders. Figure 9 provides an overview of the market value 
of the shares of stock exchange listed companies in hands of foreign shareholders. In 
all countries, with the exception of Italy, the importance of foreign shareholders 
moderately increased. Overall, in the UK, France, Belgium and Spain between 35 per 
cent and 40 per cent of the market value of the companies are in hands of foreigners. 
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In Italy and Germany the importance of foreign shareholders is significantly lower 
with levels of approximately 20 per cent in Germany and only 15 per cent in Italy. In 
light of the previous findings it can be assumed that in Spain foreign shareholders 
hold a significant part of the smaller stakes in listed companies, whilst in Germany 
foreign shareholders have acquired many large stakes. Foreign shareholders seem to 
be prudent vis-à-vis investments in Italian companies. In Belgium, France and the UK 
foreign investors invest equally in large and small shareholder stakes.  
 
 
Figure 9: Market value of stock exchange listed companies in hands of foreign 
shareholders (1999-2007) 
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Source: FESE, Share Ownership Structure in Europe, Brussel, December 2008. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Shareholder rights received considerable attention both from a political and a 
scientific perspective. It resulted in a better understanding of the role and importance 
of shareholders in corporate governance over the last decades. In many countries 
shareholders were offered more rights against “inappropriate” behaviour of other 
corporate constituents or colleagues. Whether these developments result in more 
market participation and deeper and more liquid markets, as argued in law and finance 
theory, remains an open question. For a large sample of European listed companies 
we revealed part of the answer: we analysed the evolution of the investment 
behaviour of foreign shareholders in a large sample of European companies between 
1999 and 2007. We considered that this type of shareholder is more sensitive to 
(changes in) shareholder rights than “national” shareholder classes.  
 
A steadily growing number of 15 to 30 per cent of all large stakes belong to foreign 
shareholders. One out of four to half of the companies in the different European 
countries have a large foreign shareholder in their shareholder circle. The importance 
of foreign non-financial companies as large shareholders is declining in all countries 
but Germany and foreign investment funds grow in number of large stakes except in 
Spain. Spain experienced also a sharp decline in the number of large foreign bank 
stakes. The average voting block of a foreign shareholder decreased in all countries 
but in Germany. This development resulted in Germany being the country with the 
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largest number of de iure foreign controlled companies of all countries in 2007. 
Foreign hedge fund and private equity funds became important foreign shareholders 
in France and Germany, whereas they are hardly present in the other countries.  
 
The results in this paper show that the hypothesis of a straightforward inverse linear 
relationship between shareholder rights and ownership concentration is not confirmed. 
The significant increase in the number of shareholder rights in Belgium, France, and 
Germany, did not result in a significant decrease in (foreign) shareholder 
concentration levels: foreign non-financial companies increased their voting position 
up to de facto controlling voting blocks in France and Germany. Neither did the 
insignificant changes in Italy, Spain and the UK resulted in a status quo in these 
countries: in Italy the average voting block of foreign shareholders dropped and 
foreign non-financial companies relinquished their de facto controlling voting blocks, 
whilst foreign individuals of British companies increased their voting block.  
 
Other features drive the development of ownership structures. These factors can be of 
a legal nature: in Europe, UCITS may not invest more than 5% of its assets in 
transferable securities or money market instruments issued by the same body and are 
prohibited to acquire any shares carrying voting rights which would enable it to 
exercise a significant influence over the management of an issuing body. A feature 
can also be shareholder specific: some Belgian families control a listed company via a 
Dutch trust (“administratiekantoor”) allowing the separation of financial benefits and 
the controlling power. 
 
 
Figure 10: Voting block of the foreign largest shareholder in 2007 
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There are other indications that the relationship between shareholder rights and 
ownership patterns are not straightforward. Many shareholder rights are related to a 
specific threshold: 5 per cent is allowed to call a general meeting, 25 per cent blocks 
important decisions, 30 per cent requires the mandatory bid offer, 50 per cent controls 
the general meeting, 75 per cent changes the articles of association and 95 per cent 
 15
squeezes the minority shareholders.16 Only a small number of these thresholds seem 
to be influential determinants for shareholder voting block acquisitions. Figure 10 
presents the voting block of the foreign shareholder of all companies in the sample if 
this shareholder is the largest shareholder. Only at the level of 30 per cent, the 
mandatory bid threshold in five of the six countries, the line is flatter. Other 
thresholds are not clearly identifiable.17   
 
These results do not reject any kind of relationship between shareholder rights and 
investment policies. First, the leximetric approach is still under construction. Not all 
rights have been addressed. Next, shareholder rights are considered of equal 
importance. It is more than likely that some rights matter more than other rights. 
Third, in a time frame of one decade the variability of both shareholder rights and 
ownership structures is relatively limited. All industrialised countries in the sample 
offer already a significant number of shareholder rights. These rights seem to be 
sufficient to appeal foreign shareholders. A larger sample of countries were the 
development of shareholder rights is more or less advanced and more longitudinal 
studies are required to reveal more precisely the relationships between (corporate and 
securities) law and the capital market.   
 
  
 
                                                  
16  These thresholds are not universal but many countries adopted these ceilings. 
17  The line is somewhat flatter around the threshold of 50 per cent but this is the case at both 
sides of the threshold. 
